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I. INTRODUCTION
The case of Pope v. Illinois1 raises the issue of the workability of
an objective, or national, standard for the determination of the third
prong of the tripartite Miller2 obscenity test: whether allegedly
obscene material lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.3 A jury convicted Richard Pope, a clerk at an adult book store,
of violating an Illinois state criminal statute4 prohibiting the sale of
1. No. 85-1973 (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6, 1986).
2. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
3. For a description of the Miller test, see infra text accompanying note 48. For a
description of the third prong before Miller as "utterly without redeeming social value," see
infra notes 46, 50 & 52.
4. The Illinois obscenity statute reads:
(b) Obscene Defined.
A thing is obscene if, considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to
prurient interest, that is, a shameful or morbid interest in nudity, sex or
excretion, and if it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor in
description or representation of such matters. A thing is obscene even though
the obscenity is latent, as in the case of undeveloped photographs.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (1983) (amended 1986). This section adopts the Roth
test. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957). See infra text accompanying note 41. Since
the formulation of the tripartite obscenity test in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the
Illinois Supreme Court in People v. Ridens, 59 III. 2d 362, 321 N.E.2d 264 (1974), has inter-
preted this section to include the Miller test, but has chosen to construe the third prong of the
test under the Roth-Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social value" standard. See infra
note 52. For a description of the obscenity test after Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413
(1966), see infra note 46 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the present-day Miller
test, see infra text accompanying notes 48-50.
The legislature amended this section, effective January 1, 1986, to read:
Any material or performance is obscene if: (1) the average person, applying
contemporary adult community standards, would find that, taken as a whole, it
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obscene magazines.5 A detective from the local police department
had entered the store in July 1983, and purchased three magazines
entitled Anal Animal, Full Throttle, and Fuck Around. 6 Upon the
court's entering the jury verdict of guilty, Pope filed timely post-trial
motions seeking a judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or in the
alternative, a new trial.7 The court denied these motions, and sen-
tenced Pope to 360 days in prison and fined him three thousand dol-
lars.' On appeal, 9 Pope asserted that the Illinois obscenity statute
violates the first amendment' ° because, among other things, "it fails to
require the application of an objective standard as opposed to a con-
temporary community standard in finding that allegedly obscene
material is 'utterly without redeeming social value.' "I" The Appel-
late Court for the Second District of Illinois held: The first amend-
ment does not require the trier of fact to apply an objective national
standard in determining whether materials are "utterly without
appeals to the prurient interest; and (2) the average person, applying contempo-
rary adult community standards, would find that it depicts or describes, in a
patently offensive way, ultimate sexual acts or sadomasochistic sexual acts,
whether normal or perverted, actual or simulated, or masturbation, excretory
functions or lewd exhibition of the genitals; and (3) taken as a whole, it lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20(b) (1986). The section as it now reads is an adoption of
the tripartite Miller test.
5. People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct.
61 (1986).
6. Id. at 732, 486 N.E.2d at 353.
7. Id. at 734, 486 N.E.2d at 354.
8. Id. The court fined the defendant, Pope, $1000 on each of three counts of obscenity.
Id.
9. In People v. Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d 595, 486 N.E.2d 345 (1985), a clerk at another
adult bookstore was similarly found guilty for selling obscene magazines under ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 11-20 (1983). An officer from the same precinct as the arresting officer in
Pope purchased the materials. Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 597, 486 N.E.2d at 347. The
Illinois appellate court consolidated Pope and Morrison for oral argument, but issued separate
opinions. Morrison, 138 III. App. 3d at 598, 486 N.E.2d at 347.
10. Pope asserted that the statute was "constitutionally weak," evidently referring to the
first amendment. Pope, 138 I11. App. 3d at 734, 486 N.E.2d at 354.
11. Id. at 735, 486 N.E.2d at 355. Morrison similarly argued that People's Instruction No.
12, the charge given at trial, improperly defined obscenity by permitting jurors to apply a
community standard rather than an objective one in determining whether the magazines were
"utterly without redeeming social value." Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 486 N.E.2d at
349. People's Instruction No. 12 provides:
A thing is obscene if considered as a whole, its predominant appeal is to a
prurient interest ... and, it goes substantially beyond customary limits of candor
in its description or representation of such matters; for example, by a patently
offensive description ... and, it is utterly without redeeming social value.
In determining whether a thing is obscene, you are to consider how it would be
viewed by ordinary adults in the whole State of Illinois ....
Morrison, 138 II1. App. 3d at 599, 486 N.E.2d at 348 (quoting PEOPLE'S INSTRUCTION No. 12,
ILLINOIS PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTION, CRIMINAL, No. 9.57 (2d ed. 1981)).
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redeeming social value."12 People v. Pope, 138 Ill. App. 3d 726, 486
N.E.2d 350 (1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986).
The application of an objective, or national, standard to the ques-
tion of serious value is essential 3 for the protection of first amend-
ment freedoms."4 Through expert testimony and evidence of literary
commentary,' 5 the trier of fact is given a tangible tool by which to
analyze this mixed question of law and fact. 16 A national standard in
this context provides the utmost protection at the trial level, and also
enables an appellate court to exercise de novo review.' 7 Although
there are some practical problems in using a national standard for the
question of serious value,'" these difficulties are tolerable in compari-
son to the unsatisfactory alternative of using a community standard. 19
While obscenity remains outside the scope of first amendment protec-
tion,2° requiring a fact finder to use a national standard for assessing
serious value is the only way to assure a sensitive determination.
Although an objective standard might not have prompted the jury to
exonerate Richard Pope in the instant case because of the explicit sex-
ual nature of the magazines in question,2' the Court must nonetheless
overturn the jury's verdict.22
II. THE PROBLEM IN CONTEXT
Recent events have contributed to an increased awareness of the
obscenity issue on both national and community levels. In the sum-
mer of 1986, Attorney General Edwin Meese's Commission on Por-
nography released a report suggesting that pornography leads to
violence. 23 Before releasing the final draft, the Commission sent let-
ters to corporations involved in the sale or distribution of pornogra-
12. See Morrison, 138 Ill. App. 3d at 600, 486 N.E.2d at 349.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 83-90.
14. For a discussion of the constitutional nature of the third prong, see infra text
accompanying notes 124-33.
15. See infra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
16. See Note, Community Standards, Class Actions, and Obscenity Under Miller v.
California, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1857 n.88 (1975).
17. For a discussion of de novo review, see infra notes 144-62 and accompanying text.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 177-81.
19. For a discussion of "community standard," see infra notes 94-100, 163 and
accompanying text.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 39-40.
21. For a discussion about the potential for overlap between value and prurience, see infra
notes 117-23 and accompanying text.
22. For a discussion of harmless error, see infra notes 61-66 and accompanying text.
23. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 977-1008,
1034-35 (1986).
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phy, such as Playboy and Penthouse magazines.2 4 The Commission
described the letter as an attempt to allow corporations to respond to
these allegations, before drafting its section on identified distributors.25
As a result, several corporations have stopped selling certain
magazines in fear of being "blacklisted." 26 After the Commission
contacted Southland Corporation, the owners of 7-Eleven Stores, the
company pulled Playboy from its shelves and urged the Commission
"that any reference to Southland or 7-Eleven be deleted from [its]
final report."'2 7 The District Court for the District of Columbia in
Playboy Enterprises v. Meese,28 however, granted a permanent injunc-
tion against the Meese Commission's dissemination of a "blacklist."2 9
The increased interest in regulating pornography is further exem-
plified through recent legislation at the local level. Municipalities
have drafted ordinances banning the pornographic depiction of
women in sexually subordinate roles.30 The Indianapolis legislature
passed one such ordinance3' through the joint lobbying efforts of anti-
pornography feminists32 and fundamentalists.33 A court struck down
this ordinance, however, as unconstitutional.34 On an even smaller
scale, municipalities recently presented an unofficial ballot on obscen-
ity in a local election.3 5 Voters in three Florida cities in November
24. Playboy Enterprises v. Meese, 639 F. Supp. 581, 583 (D.D.C. 1986).
25. Id. at 585.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 583-84.
28. 639 F. Supp. 581 (D.D.C. 1986).
29. Id.
30. See generally INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16 (amended 1984), cited in American
Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affid, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986);
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE § 139.10 (1983). In the Meese Commission's final report, the
Commission stated that "[t]he changes between 1970 and 1985 are most apparent in the
increase in the numbers who perceive that. exposure to these materials lead [sic] to loss of
respect for, and the commission of sexual violence against, women." ATTORNEY GENERAL'S
COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 937 (1986).
31. INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16 (amended 1984), cited in American Booksellers Ass'n
v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), affJd, 106 S. Ct. 1172 (1986). The ordinance defines
pornography as "the graphic sexually explicit subordination of women, whether in pictures or
in words." INDIANAPOLIS, IND., CODE § 16-3(q) (198-), quoted in Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 324.
32. As opposed to anti-censorship feminists. See Duggan, Hunter & Vance, False
Promises: Feminist Antipornography Legislation in the U.S., in WOMEN AGAINST CENSORSHIP
130 (V. Burstyn ed. 1985).
33. American Booksellers Ass'n v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323, 324 (7th Cir. 1985), afl'd, 106 S.
Ct. 1172 (1986). The fundamentalists have religious and moral reasons for wanting to censor
pornography. The radical feminists desire to eliminate pornography that depicts women in a
violent and demeaning fashion because they assert that it promotes violent crimes against
women. TAKE BACK THE NIGHT 19-20 (L. Lederer ed. 1980).
34. Hudnut, 771 F.2d at 327-34.
35. 'Hail Mary' Question Shows Voters Resent Films Mocking Religion, Miami Herald,
Nov. 5, 1986, at 4B, col. 5.
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1986, responded affirmatively to a straw ballot question of whether
they found it "offensive, annoying and obscene" for material to
"degrade basic religious beliefs by use of nudity, sexual acts or profan-
ity."'3 6 This sampling reflects some communities' strong interest in
regulating pornography.
These efforts, and numerous others, have triggered a response
from anti-censorship organizations. The National Coalition Against
Censorship held a public information briefing on the Meese Commis-
sion prior to the release of the Commission's final report.3 7 This brief-
ing featured speakers in the areas of literature, publishing, law,
medicine, and sex education.38 It is apparent that the future direction
of obscenity law is of intense concern to national and local groups on
both sides of the debate-and to distributors, publishers, and citizens
as a whole. The timeliness of this issue is perhaps the main reason
why the Supreme Court of the United States has agreed to hear Pope
v. Illinois, a case dealing with an uncertain aspect of obscenity law.
A. The History of Obscenity Law: From Roth to Miller
The Supreme Court of the United States expressly held for the
first time in Roth v. United States39 that "obscenity is not within the
area of constitutionally protected speech or press."4 In order to
determine whether material deserved first amendment protection, the
Court defined obscenity in terms of contemporary community stan-
dards to be applied by a jury: "whether to the average person, apply-
ing contemporary community standards, the dominant theme of the
material taken as a whole appeals to prurient interest."'" Although
the Court measured obscenity on the basis of prurient interest, it rec-
ognized that ideas having even the slightest social importance have
full protection under the first amendment.42 A few years later, Jus-
tices in two separate plurality opinions43 interpreted the phrase "con-
36. Id. The straw vote question was prompted by the film Hail Mary, depicting "a
contemporary version of the Bible story set in a gas station," with nudity. Id. The question as
worded assumed that nudity or sexual acts undermine religious beliefs.
37. NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST CENSORSHIP, THE MEESE COMMISSION EXPOSED:
PROCEEDINGS OF AN NCAC PUBLIC INFORMATION BRIEFING ON THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY (1986).
38. Id.
39. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
40. Id. at 485.
41. Id. at 489. For a discussion of the term "prurient," see infra notes 113-16 and
accompanying text.
42. 354 U.S. at 484.
43. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (Brennan & Goldberg, JJ., plurality); Manuel
Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., plurality).
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temporary community standard" to be a national standard.44
The Court in yet another plurality opinion, Memoirs v. Massa-
chusetts,45 refined Roth into a three-prong test incorporating prurient
interest, patent offensiveness, and the requirement that the material be
"utterly without redeeming social value."46  It was not until the
landmark decision of Miller v. California47 in 1973 that the Supreme
Court came to a consensus on the test to be used in finding a work
obscene, as well as the standards to be applied to the first two prongs.
Redefining the tripartite Roth-Memoirs test, the Court set out guide-
lines for the trier of fact:
(a) whether "the average person, applying contemporary commu-
nity standards" would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals
to the prurient interest; (b) whether the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by
the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a
whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value."a
The Court expressly declined to adopt the social value test of
Memoirs,4 9 and instead articulated a "serious value" requirement that
the prosecution might be able to prove more easily." Regarding the
phrase "contemporary community standards," the Court rejected a
44. In Manuel Enterprises, Justices Harlan and Stewart signified that the proper standard
to apply under a federal obscenity statute was a national one. 370 U.S. at 488. Two years later
in Jacobellis, involving an Ohio state obscenity statute, Justices Brennan and Goldberg wrote:
"We ... reaffirm the position taken in Roth to the effect that the constitutional status of an
allegedly obscene work must be determined on the basis of a national standard." 378 U.S. at
195. Justices Douglas and Black stated that obscenity should be constitutionally protected
under the first amendment. Id. at 196. But commentators have suggested that, if forced to
choose, Justices Douglas and Black would have preferred a national standard over a local one.
See Waples & White, Choice of Community Standards in Federal Obscenity Proceedings.- The
Role of the Constitution and the Common Law, 64 VA. L. REV. 399 (1978). This suggestion
indicates a belief that a national standard would provide greater first amendment protection.
45. 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (plurality opinion).
46. Id. at 418. Under the Memoirs test, in order for a work to be found obscene, the
prosecution must satisfy three elements:
(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to a prurient
interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts
contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation
of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.
Id.
47. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
48. Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
49. Id.
50. According to the Miller Court, the Memoirs "utterly without redeeming social value"
test was "a burden virtually impossible to discharge under our criminal standards of proof,"
requiring "the prosecution to prove a negative." Miller, 413 U.S. at 22. The Miller standard is
more favorable to the prosecution's case because it provides less first amendment protection
than the Memoirs standard. Justice Brennan, however, in his dissenting opinion in Paris Adult
Theatre I v. Slaton, asserted that "[w]hether it will be easier to prove that material lacks
[Vol. 41:855
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uniform national interpretation for what appeals to the prurient inter-
est as well as for what is patently offensive, discerning these first two
prongs as questions of fact, and relying on a history of permitting
triers of fact to apply community standards in other areas of the
law. 5' The Miller Court, however, failed to clarify the appropriate
standard for the third prong.52
B. Post-Miller: Failure to Clarify the Standard
for the Third Prong
Considering the lack of consensus among the Justices in obscen-
ity cases prior to 1973,53 it is not surprising that since that time the
Supreme Court has failed to clarify the third prong of the Miller test
and its applicable standard. Rather than hold that the trier of fact
must determine "serious value" through an objective, national stan-
dard, the Court merely has alluded to this distinction without expla-
nation. 4 In Smith v. United States,5 the Court strongly emphasized
'serious' value than to prove that it lacks any value at all remains, of course, to be seen." 413
U.S. 49, 98 (1973).
51. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30. The Court, in rejecting a national standard, stated that "[t]o
require a State to structure obscenity proceedings around evidence of a national 'community
standard' would be an exercise in futility." Id. The Miller Court also referred to Chief Justice
Warren's dissent in Jacobellis: "It is my belief that when the Court said in Roth that obscenity
is to be defined by reference to 'community standards,' it meant community standards-not a
national standard, as is sometimes argued. I believe that there is no provable 'national
standard'..... Id. at 32 (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200 (1964) (Warren, C.J.,
dissenting)).
52. Although the Illinois Supreme Court has adopted the Roth-Memoirs "utterly without
redeeming social value" standard as the third prong rather than the Miller "lacking serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value" standard, it is of no consequence which test is
used when addressing the question of whether an objective standard should be applied.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10, Pope v. Illinois, No. 85-1973 (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6,
1986); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding that the Court will not review
a state court decision expressly based on independent and adequate state grounds, which
provide more protection than the federal Constitution).
53. The Court in Miller stated that no majority has ever agreed on an obscenity standard,
besides the one in Roth. Miller, 413 U.S. at 22 (citing Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 770-
71 (1967)). This is evidenced by the string of plurality opinions from Manual Enterprises v.
Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962), to Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S. 413 (1966). As late as 1974,
Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Marshall, in Jenkins v. Georgia, opined that the then new
Miller formulation "does not extricate us from the mire of case-by-case determinations of
obscenity." 418 U.S. 153, 162 (1974) (Brennan, Stewart & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
Ironically, the Jenkins Court probably further muddled Miller by holding that the film in
question, Carnal Knowledge, was not patently offensive despite an opposing unanimous state
court jury verdict. The Court spent much of its opinion on an analysis of movie critiques to
determine whether the film lacked serious value. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 158-60.
54. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
Some federal decisions have interpreted Miller as a rejection of a national standard for only the
first two prongs. See United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d 826, 835 (1 1th Cir. 1982) (trier of fact
should not rely on contemporary community standards in determining whether films lack
1987]
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Miller's reference to prurient appeal and patent offensiveness as ques-
tions of fact to be measured by contemporary community standards,
and described the Miller Court's rejection of a uniform national stan-
dard as applicable only to those prongs.' 6 The Smith Court, however,
did not expressly state that a national standard be applied to the third
prong.
5 7
Courts generally have distinguished the third prong of the Miller
test as the one to be carefully considered. Opinions after the Miller
decision have referred to "serious value" as the prong necessitating a
higher standard of review.58 Others have referred to the first two
prongs as questions of fact, 9 and to the third as one of "constitu-
tional" fact.60 These allusions seem significant in determining
whether serious value should be measured on the basis of a national
standard. Perhaps these references are an indication that the third
serious value); United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
third prong requires an objective standard, that Miller confines the application of
contemporary community standards to the first two prongs, and that Miller does not suggest
that "scientific value ... be judged on such a parochial basis"); Castle News Co. v. Cahill, 461
F. Supp. 174, 179 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (Miller requires an objective standard in applying the third
prong.); cf United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 463 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S.
1165 (1985) (greater scrutiny of third prong on appellate review).
55. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
56. Id. at 292-93.
57. The Smith Court stated:
The phrasing of the Miller test makes clear that contemporary community
standards take on meaning only when they are considered with reference to the
underlying questions of fact .... [A]ppeal to the prurient interest is one such
question of fact for the jury to resolve. The Miller opinion indicates that patent
offensiveness is to be treated in the same way.
431 U.S. at 300-01. As for the third prong, the Court stated that it "is not discussed in Miller
in terms of contemporary community standards." Id. at 301.
58. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977); Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115,
118 (1973); United States v. Merrill, 746 F.2d 458, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1984).
59. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 309 (1977); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30
(1973); United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 570 (9th Cir. 1977).
60. In Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229 (1972), the Court addressed the question of
whether an article and a poem printed in an underground newspaper were serious art under
the Roth-Memoirs test by determining whether the "dominant" theme appealed to the prurient
interest. The Court reasoned that "while there is an undeniably subjective element in the test
as a whole, the 'dominance' of the theme is a question of constitutional fact." Id. at 232. This
approach represents the view that the first and third prongs are mutually exclusive. For a
discussion of overlap between prurience and serious value, see infra notes 117-23 and
accompanying text. Although the Court still referred to the first two prongs of Miller as
questions of fact twelve years later in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466
U.S. 485 (1984), it recognized the power of appellate courts to conduct an independent review
of constitutional claims when necessary. The Court specifically referred to de novo review of
the first two prongs. Id. at 506. Perhaps the Court was suggesting that all three prongs were
mixed questions of fact and law, yet somehow the third always necessitated independent
review. For a discussion of de novo review, see infra notes 144-62 and accompanying text.
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prong's significance is self-evident. Nevertheless, the reasons for such
disparate treatment need to be articulated.
The lack of clarity and consistency in the application of obscen-
ity standards places an unfair burden on the victims of obscenity
laws-movie producers, theater owners, publishers; store owners and
clerks, and patrons of pornography-who may be unkowningly in
violation of the law. In addition, the differing approaches courts take
in determining whether an admittedly incorrect jury instruction is
harmless error further complicate obscenity law. In Hamling v.
United States,6 the trial judge instructed the jury to apply the "com-
munity standards of the 'nation as a whole'" to determine whether
the brochure in question was obscene.62 The Supreme Court held
that, although the jury charge delineated a wider area than warranted
by Miller,63 it was harmless error because the prosecution did not con-
vince the jury that a national sampling provided less protection than a
community standard.64
On the other hand, the court in United States v. Heyman 65 held
that a jury charge to apply contemporary community standards for
the third prong was constitutionally erroneous and therefore must be
"harmless beyond a reasonable doubt."' 66 The Heyman court thereby
avoided the uncertain inquiry of prejudicial error on the basis of jury
persuasion or understanding. Because of the ambiguity found not
only in opinions, but in jury instructions themselves,67 these sources
provide the public with little guidance.
61. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
62. Id. at 107.
63. Id.
64. Because the prosecution's witness stated that "essentially the same kinds of material
are found throughout the United States," among other dialogue between the witness and
counsel, the Court concluded that the erronous jury charge did not require reversal. Hamling
v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 110 (1974). The Court reasoned that "the excision of the
references to the 'nation as a whole' . . . would [not] have materially affected the deliberations
of the jury." Id. at 108. Compare United States v. Cutting, 38 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977) (It was harmless error to instruct the jury to use a national
standard to determine obscenity as a whole because the record contained no evidence of a
national standard that would have tended to persuade the jury that the national standard was
stricter than the local standard.) with United States v. Henson, 513 F.2d 156 (9th Cir. 1975) (It
was prejudicial error for the judge to instruct the jury to decide the question of obscenity using
a national standard because the government may have succeeded in its attempt to convince the
jury that Californians would permit more sexual candor than Americans as a whole.).
65. 562 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1977).
66. Id. at 318.
67. Obscenity is defined in the Pattern Jury Instructions of both the Fifth and Eleventh
Circuits as follows:
For something to be "obscene" it must be shown that the average person,
applying contemporary community standards and viewing the material as a
whole, would find (1) that the work appeals predominantly to "prurient"
1987]
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Against a background of controversy and uncertainty in the law,
the Supreme Court of the United States is faced with an opportunity
to alleviate the confusion. Although the ultimate solution would be to
rid the nation of obscenity legislation directed at consenting adults,
and to revitalize obscenity's first amendment protections, in light of
our conservative times, such a solution is unlikely; and therefore, such
a focus in this Note would be futile. "[A]s long as government
chooses to remain in the distasteful business of censorship,"6 the
Supreme Court in Pope v. Illinois69 should incorporate the allusions of
Miller and Smith as its holding in order to maintain the highest possi-
ble protection for literary, artistic, political, and scientific works.
III. AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD FOR THE THIRD PRONG
The Illinois appellate court in People v. Pope70 upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Illinois obscenity statute,71 and stated: "[T]he
United States Supreme Court has never held that an objective stan-
dard as opposed to a community one should be applied in adjudging if
materials are 'utterly without redeeming social value.' "72 This
court's reasoning was cursory and misguided: although the Supreme
Court has not directly decided this issue,73 strong implications within
interest; (2) that it depicts or describes sexual conduct in a patently offensive
way; and (3) that it lacks serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 11TH CIR., MAILING OBSCENE MATERIAL, No. 36, at 143
(1985) (to be used in actions filed under 18 U.S.C. § 1461 (1982)); PATTERN JURY INSTRUC-
TIONS 5TH CIR., INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL (FOR PURPOSE OF
SALE OR DISTRIBUTION), No. 26, at 109-10 (1983) (to be used in actions filed under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1465 (1982)). In addition, the instructions of both circuits state: "[I]t is for you to say
whether the material in this case has [serious] value." PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS 11TH
CIR., MAILING OBSCENE MATERIAL, No. 36, at 145 (1985) (emphasis added); PATTERN JURY
INSTRUCTIONS 5TH CIR., INTERSTATE TRANSPORTATION OF OBSCENE MATERIAL (FOR
PURPOSE OF SALE OR DISTRIBUTION), No. 26, at 112 (1983) (emphasis added). Professor
Bender's federal jury instructions similarly provide that a juror must apply present-day com-
munity standards in order to determine whether the third prong is satisfied. M. BENDER,
MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS § 45.01, at 15 (1986).
Perhaps the most confusing instruction charges that, in order for a juror to find that the
third prong is satisfied, he or she must find "that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the
prurient interests; that the work, taken as a whole, depicts or describes, in a patently offensive
way, sexual conduct; and that the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic polit-
ical or scientific value." Id.
68. United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705, 712
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
69. No. 85-1973 (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6, 1986).
70. 138 II1. App. 3d 726, 486 N.E.2d 350 (1985), cert. granted, 107 S. Ct. 61 (1986).
71. See supra note 4.
72. Pope, 138 I11. App. 3d at 735, 486 N.E.2d at 355.
73. One commentator stated that the Supreme Court in Smith v. United States, 431 U.S.
291 (1977), explicitly held that the third prong cannot vary regionally. Schauer, Reflections on
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Smith 74 and Miller, 5 and their interpretations by lower courts, lend
credence to the position that the first amendment mandates an objec-
tive standard. The Supreme Court of the United States in Smith dis-
tinguished the serious value prong on five occasions within its
decision. 76 The court in United States v. Bagnell77 relied on Smith,
stating that the trier of fact is not to rely on contemporary community
standards in determining whether the materials in question possess
serious value.78 Similarly, in United States v. Heyman,79 the appellate
court reversed a conviction because the trial court instructed the jury
to apply community standards in determining the third prong.80 In
addition, the Attorney General's Commission on Pornography stated
in its final report that the Miller Court "clearly found [the first two
prongs] subject to local community standards, leaving the question of
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to be determined
by a national standard."'" Yet it is apparent from the Pope decision
that courts need an explicit guideline to follow. For this reason, it is
time to re-evaluate the standards used in this constitutional issue.
A. A Theoretical Framework
Before analyzing the application of an objective standard to the
third prong of the Miller test, it is necessary to examine why the
Supreme Court dispensed with this standard as applied to the first two
"Contemporary Community Standards": The Perpetuation of an Irrelevant Concept in the Law
of Obscenity, 56 N.C.L. REV. 1, 21 (1978).
74. 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
75. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
76. First, the Court explained that in Miller it had rejected a uniform national standard for
the first two prongs, holding that these were questions of fact to be measured by contemporary
community standards. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 292-93 (1977) (citing Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 30-34 (1973)). Second, the Court stated that appeal to the prurient
interest and patent offensiveness are questions of fact for the jury. Id. at 301. Third, the Court
emphasized that it did not discuss literary, artistic, political, or scientific value in Miller in
terms of contemporary community standards. Id. Fourth, the Court held that the first two
prongs are to be considered in light of jurors' understanding of contemporary community
standards. Id. at 309. Last, the Court stated that the third prong is "particularly amenable to
appellate review." Id. at 305.
77. 679 F.2d 826 (11th Cir. 1982).
78. Id. at 835.
79. 562 F.2d 316 (4th Cir. 1977).
80. Id. at 318. The petitioner in Pope cited Smith, Bagnell, and Heyman in support of his
position in his petition for certiorari. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 10- 11, Pope v. Illinois,
No. 85-1973 (U.S. cert. granted Oct. 6, 1986).
81. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMISSION ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT 1290
(1986) (citing Miller, 413 U.S. at 31). In addition, the Commission stated that "[tihe third
facet of the Miller test . .. is never in any event to be determined by reference to local
standards. Here the frame of reference must in all cases be national." Id. at 259 n.36 (citing
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977)).
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prongs in Miller v. California.82 The Supreme Court has defined an
objective standard as a national standard 3-- one varying in meaning
from time to time, not place to place.14 Before Miller, the Court
relied on this standard in determining whether a work was obscene
because of the sensitive, constitutional nature of such a determina-
tion. 5 With a community standard, "constitutional limits of free
expression ... would vary with state lines." 6 In Jacobellis v. Ohio, 7
Justices Brennan and Goldberg were concerned that a local standard
would deter the dissemination of works that were held obscene in one
locality in other localities where they might not be held obscene.,
According to these Justices, a community standard would result in
the restriction of public access to works that the state could not have
constitutionally suppressed directly.8 9 Another reason why they con-
sidered a national standard appropriate was that it effectuates
independent review as a means of preserving freedom of expression.9"
Unfortunately, courts have neglected to provide examples of a
national standard, or the means of deriving this standard. Interest-
ingly, the Supreme Court, in Hamling v. United States,9 suggested
that there may be no difference between local and national standards
as applied.
92
82. 413 U.S. 15, 30, 32 (1973).
83. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974) (objective standard defined as a
uniform, nationwide standard); Miller, 413 U.S. at 30 (objective standard defined as a fixed,
uniform standard).
84. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 193 (1964) (citing United States v. Kennerley, 209 F.
119, 121 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
85. The task is sensitive because obscenity is not protected speech under the first
amendment. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); see United States v. 35 MM.
Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705, 712 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed,
403 U.S. 925 (1971) (intimating that obscenity regulation is within sensitive area of
constitutional judgment).
86. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 194-95 (quoting Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 335
(1946)).
87. 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (plurality opinion).
88. Id. at 194.
89. Id. at 194-95 (citing Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959)). See Daniels, The
Supreme Court and Obscenity: An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional Policy-Making, 17 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 757 (1980) (suggesting that material consisting of homosexual and
sadomasochistic themes are more likely to be judged obscene by jurors because of individual
prejudices).
90. Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 188 n.3. But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, 466 U.S. 485 (1984) (recognizing that "prurient appeal" and "patent offensiveness" are
subject to de novo review in certain cases). For a discussion of Bose, see infra text
accompanying notes 149-61.
91. 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
92. Rather than base prejudicial error on the jury instruction, the Court based it on
whether the jury would tend to believe one standard was more strict than the other in the
particular case. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text. In addition, the Court referred
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Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in Miller switched from a
national to a community standard. 93 The idea of a contemporary
community standard is based on the proposition that neither personal
opinions nor the "effect on a particularly sensitive or insensitive per-
son" form the basis of a determination of obscenity.94 In several
cases, the Court has attempted to describe the meaning of "contempo-
rary community standards." In Hamling,95 it likened the standard to
the concept of "reasonableness" in other areas of the law. 96 Accord-
ing to the Court in Kois v. Wisconsin,97 a contemporary community
standard is subjective rather than objective, leaving room for personal
judgment.98 In Smith, Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority,
stated that the jury must consider the community99 along with its own
understanding of the average person in that community."°
Perhaps the main reason for the switch to community standards
was the inherent difficulty in defining a national standard for obscen-
ity. When the Miller Court rejected a national standard, it cited Chief
Justice Warren's dissenting opinion in Jacobellis v. Ohio 0 that "there
is no provable 'national standard,' "02 further describing it as "hypo-
thetical and unascertainable."'' 3 Ironically, both sides of the debate
based their respective arguments-for and against a community stan-
dard-on the benefits, or lack thereof, of differing community mores.
Those in favor of a national standard asserted that free expression
cannot be determined by local standards for fear of preventing dis-
semination of material by those unwilling to risk criminal convic-
tion.104 Those perpetuating a local community standard-be it town,
to the "confusing and often gossamer distinctions between 'national' standards and other types
of standards." Hamling, 418 U.S. at 109.
93. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30, 32 (1973).
94. Hamling, 418 U.S. at 107. For a complete discussion of contemporary community
standards in obscenity law, see generally Schauer, supra note 73.
95. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974).
96. Justice Rehnquist stated that "[a] juror is entitled to draw on his own knowledge of the
views of the average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for making the
required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge of the propensities of a
'reasonable' person in other areas of the law." Id. at 104-05.
97. 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
98. Id. at 232.
99. Under Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974), and Hamling v. United States,
418 U.S. 87, 107 (1974), the judge need not specify the geographic boundaries of the
community.
100. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977).
101. 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
102. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 32 (1973) (quoting Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 200
(Warren, C.J., dissenting)).
103. Id. at 31.
104. Id. at 32 n.13 (citing Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 193-95).
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county, city, or state' 015 -expressed the importance of diversity over
the absolutism of uniformity. °6 Apparently because a local commu-
nity standard was more workable and more easily defined,10 7 the
Supreme Court expressly chose it over its national counterpart.0 8
This switch, however, did not necessarily include the third prong
of the Miller test. ' 09 As previously discussed, the Court distinguished
this prong without explanation. "0 This is the precise issue that the
Supreme Court- is forced to address in Pope v. Illinois. An express
holding mandating the application of an objective standard to the
third prong might solve the uncertainty in the courts, and result in
greater protection of first amendment freedoms for literary, artistic,
political, and scientific works, while maintaining diversity for the
determination of prurient interest and patent offensiveness. I I  The
issue to address at this stage of the analysis is whether the first and
third prongs differ to the extent that they necessitate the use of sepa-
rate standards." ' 2
The Supreme Court has defined "prurient" as "a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion, and if it goes substantially
beyond customary limits of candor in description or representation of
105. The Court in Hamling v. United States stressed the insignificance of geographic
boundaries for determining contemporary community standards:
Our holding in Miller that California could constitutionally proscribe obscenity
in terms of a "statewide" standard did not mean that any such precise geographic
area is required as a matter of constitutional law.
418 U.S. 87, 105 (1974).
106. Miller, 413 U.S. at 33.
107. But see Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314 (1973) (Brennan, Stewart &
Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (intimating that a standard for such a culturally diverse state as
California is no more ascertainable than a national standard).
108. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 32.
109. See Smith, 431 U.S. at 292, 301, 309; Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
110. See supra notes 54-60 and accompanying text.
I l. In Miller, the Court ruled that the fact finder must judge both patent offensiveness and
prurient appeal by contemporary community standards. 413 U.S. at 30; see Smith, 431 U.S. at
292-93. 0
112. The second prong of "patent offensiveness" is not compared in this analysis. The
Miller Court offered examples of what a state statute could define under this part of the test:
(a) Patently offensive representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts,
normal or perverted, actual or simulated.
(b) Patently offensive representation or descriptions of masturbation,
excretory functions, and lewd exhibition of the genitals.
413 U.S. at 25. The delineation of specific acts which constitute patently offensive behavior
obviates the need to compare this prong with the requirement of serious value. (This is not to
say that patently offensive material is not or cannot be of serious value.) On the other hand,
serious value and works appealing to prurient interest seem to be natural comparisons because
there are no definite guidelines. See Schauer, supra note 73, at 17-21 (stating that the patent
offensiveness prong of the Miller test is unnecessary).
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such matters."" ' 3 The Court stressed that "prurient" was not synony-
mous with sex," 4 or "normal" sexual desire," 5 but merely described
the manner in which sex was portrayed. In other words, if the man-
ner appeals to the prurient interest, the film, book, or magazine is
obscene." 6 The juxtaposition of value within this definitional frame-
work is important in order to determine whether the third prong
mandates the use of a separate standard. Before Miller, the Court in
Kois v. Wisconsin 117 supported the proposition .that, the, trier of fact
need only use one standard to measure the first and third prongs. The
Court determined serious value on the basis of whether the "'domi-
nant' theme" appeals to the prurient interest," 18 thus treating the two
prongs-prurience and value-as mutually exclusive. Such a proposi-
tion, however, not only obviates the need for a separate measure, but
also the need for a third prong; once a jury determines that a work
appeals to prurient interests, it necessarily follows that the work lacks
serious value.' Yet this proposition is erroneous because it does not
recognize the existence of overlap between value and prurience.1
2 0
The Supreme Court's articulation of a three-prong test only one year
later in Miller v. California,'2' based on the separate concepts of pru-
rient appeal and value stressed in the Roth and Memoirs decisions,
22
demonstrates that there must be potential for overlap between pruri-
ence and serious value. The film Carnal Knowledge is a prime exam-
113. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 n.20 (1957) (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 207.10(2) (Tent. Draft No. 6, 1957)). The Court also defined prurient as "material having a
tendency to excite lustful thoughts." Id.
114. Id. at 487.
115. United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 432 F.2d 705, 711
(2d Cir. 1970), cert dismissed, 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
116. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 487 (1957). The use of such undefinable terms as
"customary limits of candor" and "normal sexual desire" illustrates the subjective nature of
these definitions. In 35 MM., for example, the court stated that "in the sensitive area of
constitutional adjudication of individual rights we must be careful to distinguish between the
arousal of sexual instinct and the perversion of those instincts to morbidity." 432 F.2d at 712.
See Schauer, supra note 73, at 15 (suggesting that "prurient" implies an immediate, non-
cognitive stimulation).
117. 408 U.S. 229 (1972).
118. Id. at 232.
119. It does not follow, however, that it will also be "utterly without redeeming social
value."
120. Interestingly, empirical studies suggest that sexually explicit materials have significant
value for many people. Kamp, Obscenity and the Supreme Court. A Communication Approach
to a Persistent Judicial Problem, 2 COMM. & LAW 1 (1980).
121. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
122. See supra notes 39-46 and accompanying text. In his concurring opinion in Roth, the
Chief Justice stated: "The line dividing the salacious or pornographic from literature or science
is not straight and unwavering." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 495 (1957) (Warren,
C.J., concurring).
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pie of material that may appeal to the prurient interest of a
community, yet which has serious artistic value.1" 3 The presence of
this area of overlap calls for the use of a separate test for the determi-
nation of value. Such a test would be useful because it provides an
additional check in the process of labeling work obscene-a process
threatening to literary, artistic, scientific, and political achievement.
It is not difficult to find support for the proposition that the third
prong of the Miller test deserves more protection than the other two
prongs: "The protection given speech and press was fashioned to
assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of polit-
ical and social changes desired by the people."1 24 The third prong has
been described as the instrument for removing speech from obscen-
ity-the protector of the "transmission of thoughts, information and
ideas"l'-and is not to be "judged on such a parochial basis" as con-
temporary community standards.2 6 This constitutional aura is also
found in jury instructions describing the third prong as one with
"roots in the First Amendment."' 27
The Supreme Court has recognized the special significance of
political, literary, and artistic value. Historically, the want of free
political expression provided the impetus for the framing of the first
amendment. The Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Green-
moss Builders 28 stated that " 'speech on public issues occupies the
"highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values," and is
entitled to special protection.' 129 In New York Times Co. v. United
States,3 ° Justice Black articulately stressed that freedom of the press
serves as an essential means towards a just political end. 131 The Court
afforded similar status to artistic expression and scientific achieve-
ment in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education: 32 "[O]ur cases have
123. A jury found the film Carnal Knowledge to be obscene: appealing to the prurient
interest, patently offensive, and lacking serious value. The Supreme Court reversed this jury
finding on the ground that the film was not patently offensive, also implying that the film did
not lack serious value. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
124. Roth, 354 U.S. at 484.
125. Schauer, supra note 73, at 21.
126. United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 318 (4th Cir. 1977). See Kois v. Wisconsin,
408 U.S. 229, 231-32 (1972) (suggesting that serious value is a question of constitutional fact
and therefore should not be measured against a contemporary community standard, which is
subjective).
127. M. BENDER, supra note 67, at 14.
128. 472 U.S. 749 (1985).
129. Id. at 759 (quoting Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983)).
130. 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
131. Justice Black stated: "In the First Amendment the Founding Fathers gave the free
press the protection it must have to fulfill its essential role in our democracy." New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717 (1971) (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
132. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
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never suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic,
economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a nonexhaustive list of
labels-is not entitled to full First Amendment protection."1 33 While
this demonstrates the special constitutional protection afforded liter-
ary, scientific, artistic, social, and political works, the question
remains whether an objective standard is the proper vehicle to provide
such protection.
Before Miller, the national standard attempted to provide "fair
warning, ''34 a necessity in connection with constitutional rights.
13 5
For reasons previously discussed, 36 however, the Court later rejected
this standard in Miller.137 Justices in earlier decisions voiced their
concern that a uniform standard fosters censorship, 38 and decisions
since Miller have regarded neither standard-objective nor local-as
more tolerant than the other.'39 Thus, why would the Supreme Court
now choose to apply a national standard to the third prong? The
answer is that the application of a national standard to the serious
value prong provides first amendment protection, and does not under-
mine the Court's concerns in switching to a community standard for
the first two prongs. The inability to prove a national standard prior
to Miller was understandable because the trier of fact was expected to
apply it to obscenity as a whole rather than solely to the third
prong."° One could not expect the attainment nor the existence of a
uniform standard for offensiveness or sexual appeal.' This is not the
case, however, with regard to serious value. As will be discussed, a
national standard for the third prong is ascertainable through evi-
133. Id. at 231.
134. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 194 (1964).
135. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 42 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
136. See supra text accompanying notes 102-08. Although determined that a national
standard was unascertainable, Justice Brennan found a contemporary community standard
"even more objectionable," subject to the prosecution's adjustment of geographic boundaries.
Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 314-15 (1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
137. Miller, 413 U.S. at 30, 32.
138. Justice Harlan expressed his fear of nationwide suppression, referring to the "danger of
a deadening uniformity." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 506 (1957) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); see United States v. 35 MM. Motion Picture Film "Language of Love," 432 F.2d
705, 710 (2d Cir. 1970) (stating that test on review should be a "sufficient evidence" test, being
the only reasonable way to obviate the need for the Court to sit as "Super Censor") (quoting
Jacobellis, 378 U.S. at 203 (Warren, C.J., dissenting)), cert. dismissed, 403 U.S. 925 (1971).
139. See supra note 64.
140. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (Brennan & Goldberg, JJ., plurality);
Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 488 (1962) (Harlan & Stewart, JJ., plurality).
141. The Miller Court stated that the first two prongs "are essentially questions of fact, and
our Nation is simply too big and too diverse for this Court to reasonably expect that such
standards could be articulated for all 50 States in a single formulation." Miller, 413 U.S. at 30.
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dence;142 and, unlike the first two prongs, the requirement of evidence
for the third prong provides a safeguard in the form of consistency.
In addition, fear of national censorship, while arguably a legitimate
concern, is already checked by the first two prongs. Because all three
prongs need to be satisfied in order for the trier of fact to find a work
obscene, 43 the use of a community standard for the first two prongs is
sufficient to protect against any threat of absolute national uniformity.
In fact, the application of a national standard solely to the serious
value prong forces the fact finder to consider both community and
national values, albeit for different criteria, striking a balance between
diversity and uniformity. Thus, the fact that the Miller Court rejected
a national standard for the first two prongs has no bearing on its
application to the third, this standard serving a protective function for
works of serious value.
The serious value prong is not only protected at trial through the
use of a national standard, but also at the appellate level through de
novo review. As early as Jacobellis,'" the Supreme Court recognized
independent review as a device for the preservation of individual free-
doms. '45 Thirteen years later, the Court in Smith described the third
prong as one "particularly amenable to appellate review."' 46 But the
Court contrasted this with appellate review of the first two prongs,
noting that "because the record never discloses the obscenity stan-
dards which the jurors actually apply, their decisions in these cases
are effectively unreviewable by an appellate court."' 147 An appellate
court would be able to review a determination that the work lacked
serious value, however, if the fact finder must apply a national stan-
dard to the third prong. 4 ' Yet, the Supreme Court in Bose Corp. v.
142. See infra text accompanying notes 172-76.
143. Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
144. 378 U.S. 184 (1964) (plurality opinion).
145. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 188 n.3 (1964) (Brennan & Goldberg, JJ., plurality)
(quoting Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscenity.: The Developing Constitutional
Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5, 119 (1960)) ("If freedom is to be preserved," the decisions of
juries or government censorship experts "must be subject to effective, independent review.").
146. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 305 (1977).
147. Id. at 315-16. The Court apparently did not intend to propose, however, that an
appellate court independently review the first two prongs because there is no evidentiary
record to review. This is evidenced by the Court's statement that "a reviewing court could not
use [similar materials as evidence] to overturn a jury verdict." Id. at 316 n. 14. According to
the Seventh Circuit, a trial judge must articulate standards to make appellate review possible.
United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Seizure No. 170, 750 F.2d 596, 601 (7th Cir.
1984).
148. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466 U.S. 485, 506 (1984). Such
review is evidenced in obscenity cases. See Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); McCauley
v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121 N.W.2d 545 (1963).
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Consumers Union of United States 149 apparently rejected differing
standards of appellate review by stating that it could independently
review the first two prongs of the Miller test as well as the last.150 In
Bose, the plaintiff sued Consumers Union for libel in a federal bench
trial. '5 The Supreme Court waived Rule 52(a)'s clearly erroneous
standard of review and held that the appellate judge must exercise de
novo review of the trial judge's finding that the defendant acted with
actual malice. 5 2 The Court noted in dicta that previously it had
"rejected the contention that a jury finding of obscenity vel non is
insulated from review so long as the jury was properly instructed and
there is some evidence to support its findings,"' 53 apparently referring
to Jenkins v. Georgia.'54 In Jenkins, the Court similarly waived any
deference to factual findings, and independently examined and
reversed a state jury finding that the film Carnal Knowledge was
patently offensive,' 55 "even though a properly charged jury unani-
mously agreed on a verdict of guilty."' 56 It is questionable, however,
whether the patent offensiveness prong formed the basis of the Court's
opinion in Jenkins. The Court seemed to be primarily motivated by
the question of serious value, spending much of its opinion analyzing
critiques and reviews of the film to determine whether it lacked seri-
ous value. 57
Yet, even if one were to accept the contention that the Jenkins
Court independently reviewed the second prong, such a determination
represents a limited circumstance. Although the Bose decision
emphasized the Court's obligation to consider all three prongs
through de novo review, the Court still distinguished the first and sec-
ond prongs from the third by recognizing that the former two require
more deference to the fact finder. 58 The Court, relying on Miller,
149. 466 U.S. 485 (1984).
150. Id. at 506-07.
151. Id. at 488-89.
152. Id. at 511. Although Bose was a federal bench trial, the Court extrapolated its analysis
to jury trials: "[T]he limitation on appellate review of factual determinations under Rule 52(a)
is no more stringent than the limitation on federal appellate review of a jury's factual
determinations under the Seventh Amendment .... Id. at 509 n.27. The Court also stated:
"[T]he rule of independent review assigns to judges a constitutional responsibility that cannot
be delegated to the trier of fact, whether the factfinding function be performed in the particular
case by a jury or by a trial judge." Id. at 501.
153. Bose, 466 U.S. at 506-07.
154. 418 U.S. 153, 159-61 (1974).
155. Id. at 161.
156. Id.
157. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 159-61. For a suggestion that Jenkins was actually a finding that
the movie was a mild and critically respected effort, see Schauer, supra note 73, at 20.
158. The Court quoted the Miller Court's reference to the first two prongs as "essentially
questions of fact." Bose, 466 U.S. at 506 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 30).
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emphasized the " 'ultimate power of appellate courts to conduct an
independent review of constitutional claims when necessary,' " explic-
itly referring to prurient appeal and patent offensiveness. 59 Such a
qualified expression of review of the first two prongs is reminiscent of
the Miller Court's unexplained distinction of the serious value prong.
In addition, the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Merrill, 60 relied on
Bose to review all of the Miller prongs, and indicated that the third is
subject to full de novo review, whereas the others are given more of an
evidenciary or intermediate review. 16 1 Thus, we are left with a theo-
retical framework whereby serious value is determined through the
use of an objective standard at the trial level, 162 subject to de novo
review.
B. Will it Work?
Evidence provides the tool for turning theory into reality, playing
a role in both the application of a standard and in the review process.
In applying a contemporary community standard to the first two
prongs of Miller, the trier of fact is permitted to rely on his or her own
notions of the standard of that community. 163 The allegedly obscene
materials alone constitute sufficient evidence for the determination of
obscenity, judged in the eyes of the average person in the commu-
nity. '64 The problem with not providing extraneous evidence in that
instance, however, is that the judge's or jury's findings are virtually
159. Id. at 506 (quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 25) (emphasis added).
160. 746 F.2d 458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985).
161. Id. at 463-64. The court, in applying the Bose-Smith standard of review, did not
disturb the district judge's determinations of the first two prongs, but rather reviewed findings
of the third prong "more extensively." See Schauer, supra note 73, at 23.
162. It is quite possible that a community standard might be more amenable to a defendant
in certain locations, i.e., in New York City or San Francisco. In these situations, applying a
community standard to the third prong would not be unconstitutional because states are free
to provide more protection than does the federal Constitution, but never less. Brown v.
Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See Waples & White, supra note 44, at 428 n.124 (stating
that the "wrong" community declaring "obscene" materials nonobscene "would not be
inconsistent with the first amendment"); cf Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (holding
that the Supreme Court of the United States will not review a state court decision expressly
based on independent and adequate state grounds that provide more protection than the
federal Constitution).
163. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973). The community need not be
defined. See supra note 99.
164. Paris, 413 U.S. at 56 (citing Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 465 (1966)). But
see United States v. 2,200 Paper Back Books, 565 F.2d 566, 569 (9th Cir. 1977) (The judge at a
bench trial could not find books to be obscene because the government did not produce
evidence of contemporary community standards and the judge's limited experience prevented
him from deriving the applicable standard on his own.).
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unreviewable. '65
Unlike a contemporary community standard, a national standard
requires the use of evidence of that standard.'66 While it may be rea-
sonable to expect jurors in detecting prurient appeal or patent offen-
siveness to determine local standards on their own, 6 7 it is unrealistic
to expect them to do so in deriving a national standard for serious
scientific, political, literary, or artistic value. If left to assess serious
value on its own, a trier of fact-jury or judge-would effectively
apply a local standard. 168 As a result, "value" would differ among
communities. 
69
Was Chief Justice Burger correct, however, in saying that the
formulation of a national standard is "an exercise in futility?"' 70 Per-
haps the answer is yes with respect to the first two prongs; 7 ' but the
165. United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Seizure No. 170, 750 F.2d 596, 599
(7th Cir. 1984); see supra note 147 and accompanying text.
166. A national standard for Miller's third prong is not "unascertainable." See, e.g.,
Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); United States v. Cutting, 538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 121
N.W.2d 545 (1963).
167. Professor Daniels points out that these phenomena vary individually. What is sexually
arousing to one may be repulsive to another. Also, cues for sexual arousal vary between the
sexes. According to one of Alfred Kinsey's studies, men generally become sexually aroused
from more direct, unambiguous cues, whereas women tend to respond to indirect, romantic
cues. Daniels, The Supreme Court and Obscenity." An Exercise in Empirical Constitutional
Policy-Making, 17 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 757, 772 (1980). In addition, people tend to judge
obscenity on the basis of what evokes negative feelings, a varying criterion. Id. at 779.
Sociological and psychological studies conclude that conservatism, defined as a type of overall
cognitive style, is a major factor in predicting assessments of pornography. Brown, Anderson,
Burggraf & Thompson, Community Standards, Conservatism, and Judgments of Pornography,
14 J. SEX RES. 81, 82, 94 (1978).
168. The view that one standard is not necessarily more strict than the other, so that
prejudicial effect depends upon the understanding of the jury, makes sense in this context. See
supra note 64. In Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974), and United States v. Cutting,
538 F.2d 835 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1052 (1977), the courts focused upon the
first two prongs in defending this view. In fact, in Cutting, before determining that a
nationwide jury instruction for obscenity as a whole was not prejudicial error, the court held
that the photographs did not fall within the description of artistic material used in Jenkins,
signifying the use of a national standard for the third prong. Cutting, 538 F.2d at 840. In
Jenkins, the Court examined literary commentary to determine that the film in question was
not obscene. 418 U.S. at 158-59.
169. The Court's reversal of the jury's censorship of Carnal Knowledge in Jenkins
exemplifies the objectionable outcome of applying a contemporary community standard to the
third prong. 418 U.S. at 161.
170. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 30 (1973).
171. In United States v. Various Articles of Merchandise, Seizure No. 170, the court did
not accept surveys of national or large geographic areas, describing them as "canned" surveys.
750 F.2d 596, 599 (7th Cir. 1984). The court claimed that "[i]f surveys are to be used, they
must be taken in the relevant area; they must address material clearly akin to the material in
dispute, and they must be good studies by the usual standards." Id. Bender's Modern Jury
Instructions cited this case for the proposition that the Seventh Circuit is critical of any
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standard is ascertainable for the third. Both before and after Miller,
the Supreme Court demonstrated that the fact finder can determine a
national standard for serious value through the use of expert testi-
mony'72 and written analyses of works.'73 In Memoirs, the trial court
heard expert testimony from professors of English and accepted book
reviews as evidence in assessing the "literary, cultural, or educational
character of the book."' 74 Similarly, the Supreme Court itself in Jen-
kins examined both favorable and nonfavorable reviews and critiques
which the appellant supplied'75 in determining that the film Carnal
Knowledge was of serious literary value.
17 6
Several problems, however, arise from relying on witnesses and
reviews for the determination of a national standard. First, as in any
area of the law, witnesses' testimony may-and probably will-con-
flict. ' In that event, the judge or jury will need to determine which
expert is more credible. This might result in a subjective outcome.' 78
Second, commentaries may conflict; but courts have considered the
mere existence of reviews as evidence of a work's literary or artistic
appeal.' Third, the question remains as to which magazines or
newspapers are appropriate publications by which to measure a
attempt to prove national standards. M. BENDER, MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS
§ 45.01, at 12 (Supp. Aug. 1986) (citing Various, 750 F.2d at 599). Counsel introduced these
surveys, however, in an attempt to depict a standard for patent offensiveness, not serious value.
172. One commentator considered expert testimony an important part of the determination
of serious value. Note, supra note 16, at 1857 n.87. An expert, however, is likely to base his or
her opinion on community rather than national values.
173. Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 158-59 (1974); Memoirs v. Massachusetts, 383 U.S.
413, 415-16 (1966).
174. Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 415-16.
175. The state did not refute the authenticity of the information supplied. Jenkins, 418 U.S.
at 158.
176. For a discussion of the Court's analysis of serious value in Jenkins and its relation to
de novo review, see supra text accompanying notes 155-57. In addition, the appellant offered
evidence that the film appeared on "Ten Best" lists and that Ann Margret received an
Acadamy Award nomination. He also offered evidence of the film's popularity by showing the
number of towns and theaters in which it played. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 158 & n.5. The Court
reprinted a section of a review from the Saturday Evening Post in its opinion. Id. at 158-59.
177. See Memoirs, 383 U.S. at 15 n.2; United States v. Heyman, 562 F.2d 316, 317 (4th Cir.
1977); McCauley v. Tropic of Cancer, 20 Wis. 2d 134, 146, 121 N.W.2d 545, 552 (1963).
178. The defendants in McCauley offered academicians to testify as to the book's
qualifications, while plaintiff's witnesses consisted of clergy and a probation officer. 20 Wis. 2d
at 146, 121 N.W.2d at 551.
179. Experts' disagreement regarding the success of the film Last Tango in Paris was
immaterial. United Artists v. Gladwell, 373 F. Supp. 247, 249 (N.D. Ohio 1974), cited in
Note, supra note 16, at 1857 ("[I]t was their agreement- that the film should be judged as
art-that was decisive."); see also Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 195 (1964) (Brennan &
Goldberg, JJ., plurality) (recognizing that the film in question was favorably reviewed in a
number of national journals, disparaged in others).
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national standard. 8° In Jenkins, the Court considered a review pub-
lished in the Saturday Evening Post.8 ' Had the review been printed
in The Village Voice, however, it is questionable whether the Court
would have considered it. Ironically, newspapers such as this would
probably need to be assessed for their literary value. Would the plain-
tiff need to show a critique of the newspaper itself? Finally, how
would a national standard be determined if the matter in dispute has
not been reviewed? Is lack of commentary equivalent to lack of seri-
ous value? These are questions that the trier of fact will be left to
answer. In comparison with the alternative of community assess-
ment, however, the problems surrounding evidence of a national stan-
dard for Miller's third prong are tolerable.
IV. CONCLUSION
The protection of first amendment freedoms of speech, press, and
expression lies at the core of labeling material "obscene." The sensi-
tivity of such a determination mandates the articulation of standards
providing this protection. Because the question of whether a work
lacks serious scientific, literary, artistic, or political value-or whether
a work is utterly without redeeming social value-is the focal point of
the Miller test as far as the protection of first amendment freedoms, it
requires great scrutiny at both the trial and appellate levels. The
application of an objective standard by the trier of fact through the
use of expert witnesses and literary commentary provides protection
up front, and makes it possible for the appellate judge to indepen-
dently review the jury's determination. The Supreme Court of the
United States has only alluded to this scheme. It now needs to articu-
late it, and Pope v. Illinois provides the opportunity. Of course, the
use of such a scheme could never be foolproof; but while the Court
chooses to refuse obscenity first amendment protection, this is the best
it can do.
SUSAN ELKIN*
180. In McCauley, the court considered the proffered periodicals to be "responsible," and
the critics to be "of recognized stature." 20 Wis. 2d at 146, 121 N.W.2d at 552. In Jenkins,
the opposition did not dispute the authenticity of the reviews. 418 U.S. at 158.
181. Jenkins, 418 U.S. at 158-59.
* This Note is dedicated to Ronald Moglia, Ed.D., for his inspiration, and to my family
for their continuous support. I would like to express my sincere appreciation to Kevin Dorse
for his expertise, guidance, and humor.
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